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Externalism, Content, and Causal Histories 
Filip BUEKENS’ 
Summary 
Externalism in philosophy of mind is usually taken to be faced with the following difficulty: 
from the fact that meanings are externally individuated, it follows that the subjective character 
of mental states and events (their accessibility for the person who “has” them) becomes proble- 
matic. On the basis of a well-founded approach to similar problems in the philosophy of action, 
I propose a solution based on two connected issues: (a) we should think of mental states not as 
beliefs, but as (defeasible) states of knowledge, and (b) thought experiments, designed to strip 
off the contribution of the world from the subject’s contribution to the contents of his mental 
states, are doomed to fail. The allegedly subjective character of propositional contentful states 
(beliefs, desires, meanings) is that they are agent-specific states. Agent-specificity is not in con- 
tradiction with mental states or intentional actions having a circumstantial nature. 
1. Narrow content versus broad content 
A well-known argument for internalism points to a counterintuitive ele- 
ment in Hilary Putnam’s famous “Meanings ain’t in the head”-dictum (see 
Putnam: 1975). If meanings are not in the head, we cannot account for the 
subjective features of mental events. The underlying assumption is obvious: 
location of meanings plays a central role in the explanation of the well-known 
and often discussed asymmetry between self-knowledge (knowing what your 
own words mean) and knowledge of other persons’ words and thoughts. 
From the thesis that the meaning of indexical terms and natural kind- 
words is determined by external objects (for natural kinds; their essence), 
Putnam infers that a speaker does not necessarily know the meaning of the 
words he’s using. (Putnam no longer accepts what he has written in his famous 
1975 paper, but I’m using his arguments here merely as a starting point for a 
more fundamental issue.) “Narrow” content is located in the head. It is the 
object of a solipsistic conception of psychology. The “broad” content of a 
* University of Tilburg, Departement Of Philosophy, PO Box 90153,5000 Le Tilburg, 
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word like “water” will say that it refers to H20.  In a number of influential 
papers, Tyler Burge has given the argument a social twist: the content of 
“that”-clauses depends not only on the natural and physical environment, but 
on the social environment too, e.g. on the linguistic practices of the com- 
munity to which the speaker belongs (see Burge: 1979). 
If broad content and narrow content are indeed two different types of con- 
tent, we must accept that a speaker does not necessarily know what he means 
by his words if the meaning of his words (the truth-conditions of sentences) 
are determined externally. This thesis can be deduced only if one assumes that 
location and knowledge of meaning are conceptually or empirically con- 
nected. If meanings are not in the head and if a speaker therefore does not al- 
ways know what he means by his words, knowledge and location of meaning 
are indeed highly related issues. 
Before I point out a non sequitur in Putnam’s argument, I would like to 
draw attention to a similar issue in the philosophy of action and its well-estab- 
lished solution proposed by Anscombe (1957) and further developed in Do- 
nald Davidson’s seminal paper “Agency” (in Davidson: 1980). I will then 
show how a similar strategy may shed new light on the above-mentioned is- 
sues. 
The problem was this: what is the relation between “Jack’s moving his 
arm”, “Jack‘s cutting with his knife” and “the killing of Jack‘s wife”?l We have 
good reasons to assume that these are different descriptions of the same ac- 
tion. Actions are bodily movements describable in terms of their intended and 
unintended effects. Described as a bodily movement (“moving his arm”), we 
may learn how the agent has done what he did, but the description does not 
assume the existence of external effects. Describing the same action as “killing 
his opponent” assumes a causal relation between the bodily movement and 
the death of a particular person. We learn what he did, but the description 
doesn’t shed light on how he did it. 
From the fact that the bodily movement is described as “killing his wife” 
only if a particular tragic effect takes place, it does not follow that the action is 
located outside the body rather than being a bodily movement. The weaker 
thesis that the action extends itself outside the body as a variable entity (Joel 
Feinberg’s famous “according principle”) is not acceptable either. What hap- 
pens can be explained as follows: the bodily movement obtains the property 
“killing the opponent” when the external effect, caused in the right way, oc- 
curs (just as Xantippe obtains the property “being the widow of Socrates” 
when Socrates dies). “Killing his wife” is a relational property of the action. 
The question goes back to a problem raised by E. Anscombe (1957). 
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Given this solution, various paradoxes in the philosophy of action are easily 
solved. The most famous is the well-known “time of a killing”-paradox, 
raised by J.J. Thomson: suppose X has been shot on January lst, but he dies 
the 4th. When was X killed? The (obvious) answer is that X was killed on 
January lst, but that this action can by described as “killing X only when X is 
dead. This solution was proposed by Davidson in his famous paper “Agency”. 
What follows from this approach for Putnam’s dictum that meanings “ain’t 
in the head”? Putnam’s thesis seems to rest on the following assumption: if the 
meaning or content of certain words is partly determined by external factors, 
content must be located externally. But from the fact that a property of an 
event located in the head depends on what is outside the head, it does not fol- 
low that the mental event itself is relocated, just as the fact that intentionally 
killing the enemy (a property of a bodily movement, depending on the occur- 
rence of external events) does not relocate the action (it remains a bodily 
movement). Similarly, from the fact that content-descriptions of events in the 
head presuppose that causal relations of those events with external objects 
and events obtain - that they have a particular causal history - a relocation of 
internal events does not follow. This solution, by the way, refutes Colin 
McGinn’s claim that externalism is not compatible with an identity theory of 
the mind. McGinn writes: 
“It is true that identifying the mind with the brain, and mental states with the brain, con- 
flicts with externalism, since the brain really does lie literally within the head. So it is a 
consequence of externalism that this simple kind of materialism is false.” (McGinn: 
1989, 15) 
McGinn seems to endorse this view, but the fallacy in the argument can be 
easily demonstrated. Externalism entails that mental or intentional descrip- 
tions are relational. Relational descriptions do not relocate anything and the 
identity-theory of mind is not endangered. Relational descriptions connect 
entities with other entities, the connection being based on specific explana- 
tory principles. When we are dealing with contentful events, those principles 
are the ones we use to make sense of persons and their behavior.* 
This is not the end of the story, however. The occurrence of external in- 
tended effects is not a sufficient condition for redescribing bodily movements 
as intentional actions. In the case of a person intentionally killing his wife, the 
death of the victim is not sufficient to allow a redescription of the bodily as a 
killing. The death of the victim must be causally related “in the right way” to 
* See Davidson (1984) for the well-known details. 
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his bodily m~vement .~ The well-known problem of deviant causal chains 
shows that the actual causal connection between the bodily movement and 
the external event plays a crucial role as to whether or not we are allowed to 
redescribe a bodily movement as a particular intentional action. Dan Dennett 
offers a famous example: suppose I try to kill my adversary by shooting him. 
My loud shot misfires, but it causes a stampede of bisons killing the opponent. 
Although an action of mine caused the death of the victim, I did not intention- 
nally kill him (I merely caused his death). 
It is by now a well-established fact that deviant causal chains may suspend 
the intentional description of an action. One lesson to be learned from this is 
the importance of the causal history of an event (its causes and its effects) 
when characterizing it as an intentional action. The intriguing element in de- 
viant causal chains is that elements that do not contribute to the contents of a 
mental event will, if absent, suspend the intentional description of that event. 
I will come back to this issue. 
Here is another example. When we describe someone as knowing that 
there’s a glass of water in front of him, the cognitive state must be caused in the 
right way by a glass of water (not by a glass of XYZ) even if HzO, the well- 
known chemical structure of water, does not figure in the causal explanation 
of his belief. By the same token, the belief must be caused in a non-deviant 
way, although we do not mention (and cannot mention) all the events (includ- 
ing other beliefs of the agent) that were causally responsible for that particular 
belief. When trying to make sense of other people’s words and beliefs, we are 
not supposed to know everything about the world and the causal connections 
between events, objects and the corresponding mental states. Neither are we 
supposed to be able always to distinguish natural kinds from artefacts or ob- 
jects that look deceivingly similar, but if the belief is caused by a hallucination 
caused by a real glass of water, we will disqualify this person as knowing that 
there’s a glass of water in front of him. It is impossible to give an a priori de- 
scription of what would be the “right way” in which the belief is caused and we 
cannot allow that all the properties of water enter in the causal explanations of 
his knowledge that there is water in front of him, but deviant cases or different 
substances will affect our description of mental states. 
To sum up: what makes the sentence “X intentionally kills his wife” or “X 
intentionally drinks water” true (in a loose sense of “making true”) is not a 
particular bodily movement or the occurrence of the intended effect, but a 
And even that is not enough: the bodily movement must be caused, in the right way, by 
the agent’s beliefs and desires. See Davidson: “Actions, Reasons and Causes” in Davidson 
(1980). 
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complex causal configuration of events: starting with the agent’s reasons and 
ending with that intended effect. No particular singular event or state can be 
pointed at as constituting a successful intentional action. Success is deter- 
mined by the full causal history. Deviant causal connections or replacements 
of objects by things with a similar macrostructure but different chemical 
properties will affect the validity of the original description. I shall now inves- 
tigate how they affect that description. 
2. Narrow content: another analogy with actions 
Fodor and Searle, among others, add to their defense of internalism the 
thesis that, if meanings were not in the head, we could no longer account for 
the association of contentful event with a conception of the world, a subjective 
point of view. Connecting contents with internal representations (the para- 
digm Fodor adheres to) makes internalism a central issue in the philosophy of 
mind, because it touches the very heart of mental phenomena: if content is 
based on a conception of the world, it can no longer be the case that ascribing 
content on the basis of particular causal-explanatory relations between minds 
and their environment (the explanation being based on principles such as ra- 
tionality, coherence and truth - carefully explored in the writings of David- 
son, David Lewis and Daniel Dennett, among others), reveals an essential 
feature of intentional phenomena. For internalism, semantic evaluation or 
causal relations with external events are irrelevant. This is the basis of Fodor’s 
“methodological solipsism” (see Fodor: 1980), Stephen Stich’s “principle of 
psychological autonomy” (see Stich: 1983) or, to a certain extent, Searle’s “re- 
discovery of the mind”.4 I shall try to show that this is not the kind of internal- 
ism we need defend if we assume, contraPutnam, that meanings are located in 
the head. On the contrary: a causal-historical view on mental events (that lo- 
cates them in the head), denies that there are, in any philosophically interes- 
ting sense, internal or external entities that confer content upon mental states. 
This form of internalism in philosophy of mind is as innocent as the internal- 
ism accepted in philosophy of action: Intentional actions are bodily move- 
ments, but there is no intrinsic property to be associated with the bodily move- 
ment that tells us what the agent intentionally did or that accounts for acting 
intentionally. In order to quahfy his bodily movement as an intentional action, 
we must consider the causal history (the causes and effects) of that movement. 
I am aware of the fact that these authors have very different, more sophisticated moti- 
vations for their projects. 
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Before I develop these points further, let me explore another analogy with 
actions. The relations between bodily movements, their external effects and 
intentional actions help explain the relation between success and failures, be- 
tween trying to act and intentionally acting. Actions succeed only if the exter- 
nal, intended effect occurs and is caused “in the right way”. We cannot reduce 
intentional action to intentionally trying to act (where the trying only involves 
a bodily m~vement).~ Contrary to many theorists, I do not think the notion of 
“trying to act” plays a central role in the theory of action. That actions succeed 
most of the time and that bodily movements have causal connections with ex- 
ternal events and states are constitutive assumptions if we want to make sense 
of actions. “Trying to A” (where “A” is the description under which the action, 
if successful, is intentional) is from this point of view not an entity that 
precedes and/or causes every intentional action, but an intentional action 
under a loaded description, either because we’re not yet sure whether the ex- 
ternal, intended effect will take place or because we know that the action 
failed (“he tried to hit the bull’s eye, but missed it”). If this is true, we can no 
longer claim that tryings are entities common to successful and unsuccessful 
actions. If a person acts successfully, we normally do not say he tried to act - 
we say he acted successfully. 
From the empirical possibility that a particular action can fail, it does not 
follow that all our actions may fail. The norm for action is: successful action, 
just as the norm for belief is: true belief (see Davidson: 1984). If an action 
fails, we can say we tried to act. “Trying to A” does not refer to something 
common to successful and unsuccessful actions; it says that, in this particular 
case, the relevant effect didn’t occur (or, in a slightly different context, that we 
are not sure the relevant effect will occur). To conceive of tryings as entities 
which cannot fail is based on the false assumption that what is immune to 
failure must play a central role in an account of acting intentionally. Our 
understanding of actions depends on the assumption that most of our actions 
succeed. Only under that assumption can we make sense of someone’s actions 
(including those that failed). This general statement doesn’t tell us (and 
shouldn’t tell us) which particular actions are successful; nor does, in a differ- 
ent context, the general statement “most of our beliefs are true” tell us which 
beliefs are actually true. Describing a particular action as “trying to A” has the 
same status as describing ourselves with the words “I believe that p” when we 
Some authors, when confronted with this claim, immediately realize that not even the 
bodily movement has to be within one’s reach. For them the trying is thus an event that p e e s  
and causes the bodily movement; see Hornsby (1980) for this theory. I develop an alternatwe 
that is in line with this paper in Buekens (1992). 
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are not sure as to what is the case: it tells us that we are not certain that the be- 
lief is actually true. 
One might be tempted to assume that tryings or attempts play a central 
role in a theory of action on the basis of the following argument: external ef- 
fects fall outside the “scope” of the agent’s control; although it is fully within 
the reach of a competent agent to move his body in a certain way, it is not (or 
no longer) up to him whether the external, intended event occurs. From the 
fact that in particular cases actions may fail because the external events do not 
occur, it is inferred that the ontology of intentional actions must be restricted 
to reasons and bodily movements (or, in the light of the fact that bodily move- 
ment may fail, to something “inside” the body: the attempt to act). 
But that is, once again, a non sequitur: just as it doesn’t follow from the fact 
that beliefs may be false that external events are to be excluded from a theory 
of cognitive states, it doesn’t follow from the fact that external effects of bodily 
movements (or bodily movements themselves) may not occur (actions may 
fail), that they are to be excluded from a theory of action. As Davidson has ar- 
gued, that most of our beliefs are true is a well-motivated normative state- 
ment; it cannot be falsified or rejected simply because false beliefs occur. The 
same is true for its equivalent in action theory: that actions are mostly success- 
ful is a normative claim; it is not refuted by the fact that particular actions can 
and do fail. 
What lies behind these attempts to formulate a coherent form of internal- 
ism is the tendency to see externalism as a theory that jeopardizes the auton- 
omy of the agent. The tendency to look for something common to successful 
and unsuccessful actions, and to think of this element (the attempt to act, the 
trying) as something that cannot fail or something one cannot be wrong about 
rests on the mistaken idea that all the elements on which intentionally acting 
depends must fall under the agent’s cognitive control. Acting successfully is a 
circumstantial matter. It depends on causal chains with external events. A the- 
ory of action must study the agent in situ. An in vitm theory of intentional ac- 
tion does not contain the necessary elements to understand the idea of acting 
intentionally. If action is circumstantial, then cognitive states must have that 
property too, or so I shall claim. 
3. Believing and knowing, trying and intentionally acting 
I shall now further develop the analogy between acting and trying to act, 
and knowing that p and believing that p. The claim is that cognitive states, like 
intentional actions, depend for their existence on causal connections with ex- 
ternal events. Once this is established, I will show that the distinction between 
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narrow content and broad content is baseless. Thought experiments designed 
to support this distinction merely reveal that, if content is based on causal con- 
nections with external objects and events, attribution of content depends on 
non-semantically relevant elements. This is the counterpart in philosophy of 
mind of giving up the idea of autonomy in philosophy of action. 
First, the analogy. The idea that externalism is a contentious conception of 
mind seems to depend on the following considerations: beliefs have content 
and can be evaluated semantically (they are true or false). But the fact that 
they can be false or can deal with inexistent entities (unicorns, square circles 
and other exotic entities) without losing content seems to imply that content 
cannot simply depend on relations with external events. True and false beliefs 
must have something in common: an abstract proposition, the intentional ob- 
ject they are “directed at” or its more popular variant: a representation 
couched in a language of thought. Content cannot be determined by what is 
the case is a belief is true, otherwise false beliefs would lack content (which 
they do not). 
We are misled here by two different uses of the locution “X believes that 
p”. There is, first, the use of the two-places predicate “to believe” in the speci- 
fication of the content of a cognitive state. It presupposes the existence of a 
mental state and a sentence connected to it by means of the predicate “be- 
lieves that”. (In this, it functions exactly the way the predicate “weighs” con- 
nects objects with numbers.) Secondly, there is the use of the predicate “be- 
lieves that” as an epistemic qualifier. When we say that X believes that p, giv- 
ing the story an epistemic twist, we say that he has a certain conception or rep- 
resentation before the mind, but we emphatically do not want to say that what 
he believes is true, that what he represents with what is the case, etc. We are 
not committing ourselves to the truth of his belief. The content of his belief is 
the way he represents the world (and not how the world presents itself to him), 
what is true from his subjective point of view. This leads to the erroneous idea 
that mind can be studied in vim, independently from the causal history of the 
states and events that constitute mindful beings: to specify the content of one’s 
belief, we specify not what they represent, but the representation itself. Not 
that the content-specifymg role of “X believes that p” is, by itself, not suffi- 
cient to call into life representations. The additional element needed to intro- 
duce these entities is based on an epistemic gloss: what we believe rests upon a 
(true or false) conception of the world. 
The epistemic gloss inspires the so-called extraction problem, an issue 
well-known to proponents of internalism.6 From the truth-conditions of the 
See for instance M. Devitt (1990). 
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sentences we use to describe the content of one’s beliefs, we must extract how 
the agent represents reality. Michael Devitt and Brian b a r  are among the 
authors who have written extensively about this problem. A scientific solipsis- 
tic psychology will study the content of beliefs, having stripped it from its truth 
conditions or the external states and events they are about, just as a scientific 
theory of action should abstract away from the external contingencies that ac- 
company intentional actions (a proposal made in Stich: 1983). 
The pressure to introduce something that is common to true and false be- 
liefs comes from a misleading but tempting conception of the mental: some- 
thing that must be in the mind even if the outside world had a totally different 
outlook. The counterpart in the philosophy of mind of the philosopher of ac- 
tion’s autonomous agent - the idea that acting simply means: moving your 
body in the right way, or trying to act - is the idea of having a representation 
before you, independent of the way the world looks. The difficulties with this 
view are mirrored in the internalism that introduces representations. It is not 
because what is described on the basis of their causal history and by invoking 
specific explanatory principles are internal events, events in the head, that we 
can assume that the described states can be studied independently from that 
causal history and the principles that make that history available to us. 
How can we avoid the epistemic gloss associated with “believing that p”? I 
propose a move that may have an air of paradox (at first sight): a switch from 
belief to kn~wledge.~ The move is paradoxical because we assume that 
“knowing that p” is “stronger” than (merely) believing that p. If X knows that 
p, he not only believes that p, but he also has the right reasons, he is justified in 
believing that p. Exploiting a suggestion made by Bernard Williams, I think 
we can reject this connotation. “I am represented as checking on someone’s 
credentials for something about which I know already. That of course encour- 
ages the idea that knowledge is belief plus reasons and so forth. But this is far 
from our standard situation with regard to knowledge; our standard situation 
with regard to knowledge (in relation to other persons) is rather that of trying 
to find somebody who knows what we don’t know; that is, to find someone 
who is a source of reliable information about something.” (Williams: 1973, 
146). The assumption is that someone is a reliable source of information 
about a particular fragment or aspect of the world only if there is particular 
causal link between this person and the fragment or aspect of the world. A 
similar idea is defended by McDowell(l980): communication is more than 
A similar move (for slightly different purposes) was proposed by S. Guttenplan at the 
Neuchstel conference (see his paper in this issue). I thank him for additional remarks at the 
conference. 
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simply making available your beliefs to others or manipulating other person’s 
beliefs about your beliefs. It is the instilling of knowledge. In communication, 
knowledge spreads like a contagious disease (a phrase we owe to Gareth 
Evans). 
The kind of externalism I try to defend in this paper is not, of course, that 
we relocate representations and think of them as external facts. Thinking of 
cognitive states as knowledge states (and not merely as belief states) reminds 
us of the platitude that, when interpreting persons, the explanatory principles 
governing that enterprise force us to consider such states as true and coherent. 
Describing them as states of knowledge (and not mere belief-states) presup- 
poses that we consider the person they are ascribed to as someone who carries 
information about the world. This is not to say that he cannot have mere be- 
liefs - where describing a cognitive state as a belief state is a loaded descrip- 
tion of that state, either because we’re not sure as to the truth of that state, or 
because we know that what we ascribe is false (cf. supra). Many discussions of 
the principle of charity deal with the kind of problems we encounter when 
confronted with someone holding sentences to be true that are obviously 
false: what he thinks of as a state of knowledge is a mere belief. As interpre- 
ters, we must assume that what we describe are states of knowledge, notwith- 
standing the fact that particular mental tokens may be mere beliefs.8 
Belief and knowledge are related to each other the way tryings are related 
to successful intentional actions. If something goes wrong in the external cau- 
sal chain (or if we expect something to go wrong), we can produce a loaded 
description of that state: we say it’s mere trying, a mere attempt, or a mere be- 
lief (not a state of knowledge). The standard case is the state that is connected 
in the right way with external events and objects: an intentional action or a 
state of knowledge. A belief is thus not arrived at by subtracting something 
from the causal chain that results in a state of knowledge, or by observing the 
internal part of that chain. It is arrived at by observing an alternative causal 
chain. 
The kind of externalism that conceives cognitive states as states of knowl- 
edge has no problem in admitting that they have causal connections with ex- 
ternal events. What is crucial here is that we are no longer tempted to intro- 
duce representations or points of view, the kind of things that have content or 
constitute content independently of their connections with the outside world. 
Cognitive states, thought of as knowledge-states, exist in the light of complex 
causal connections with external events. It is the causal chain leading to that 
particular state that is responsible for our describing that state as, say, know- 
* See also s. Guttenplan’s paper in this volume for more arguments that support this view. 
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ing that there’s water in front of you. Deviant causal chains or misleading cir- 
cumstances (H20/XYZ-cases) may prevent us from ascribing knowledge to a 
person. Instead, as we shall see in a moment, they may force us to describe 
them as something less: mere belief states. 
Let’s take stock. We have reached two conclusions: (a) elements in the 
causal history of a mental event that do not contribute to its contents may 
nevertheless, when absent, affect the validity of the content-ascription; (b) 
the description of mental states requires that we account for them as knowl- 
edge states. We give up this default assumption and characterize them as mere 
beliefs when we are in doubt about their truth-value, or when we know that 
elements in the causal history of that state prevent us from putting the agent in 
the position of someone who knows what’s going on. 
If the relevance of causal chains must be acknowledged for when describ- 
ing cognitive states or intentional actions (thereby accepting that externalism 
is correct) we are in for a much stronger and probably more controversial 
claim. I shall dub this position actualistic externalism. Actualistic externalism 
claims that thought experiments designed to draw a distinction between nar- 
row and broad content, between the contribution of the subject and the con- 
tribution of the world to the contents of a mental state, have no real signifi- 
cance. 
4. Actualistic externalism 
In the first part of this paper, I stated that elements which are not relevant 
in identifymg the content of an event but nevertheless determine its identity, 
may affect the truth of the description under which it is intentional. I will now 
elaborate that thesis and then connect it with issues from the foregoing sec- 
tion. 
First, we have the claim that any change in the causal history of a mental 
event (by replacing it by a physical duplicate, by changing its environment, by 
introducing deviations in the causal chain) changes the identity of that mental 
token. This is trivial in the light of Leibniz’ principle that the identity of an ob- 
ject or event is determined by all its properties (relational, intrinsic or what- 
ever) and the relevance of the history of an event for the properties it has or 
the descriptions that are true of it (I hope nothing in this discussion depends 
on the question whether we accept either properties or predicates that are true 
of object^).^ Properties can be relational. Any change in the history of an 
event may add or withdraw relational properties and thus change its identity. 
Pascal Engel has persuaded me that difficulties are lurking here. 
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This claim is not meant to imply or to suggest that there are no other features 
that determine the identity of an event. It merely states that, among the 
properties that determine its identity, some are historical, i.e. determined by 
its causal history. It is obvious that not everything that determines the identity 
of a mental event contributes to its content or figures in the content of that 
event. 
The second claim is more contentious: rational explanations are token- 
bounded. When we try to make sense of other persons, and the reasons on 
which they act, we redescribe token-events on the basis of well-known expla- 
natory principles such as overall coherence and truth. Agents must be ra- 
tional, most of their beliefs must be true and their desires must be reasonable 
in the light of those beliefs. A rational explanation is the explanation of a 
token-action, in the light of its overall coherence with other actions (verbal or 
non-verbal). Token-boundedness of rationalizing explanations means that 
such explanations do not start with a full-blown theory which is then applied 
to particular cases, but rather with an evolving theory of a person’s mind, 
geared to particular actions or speech acts.1° Token-boundedness entails that 
the intentional description a rational explanation has produced for a particu- 
lar event e cannot be used to describe an event e’ that is in any physical (but 
not historical) respect the same as the original event (this is one aspect of Da- 
vidson’s theory of the supervenience of the mental on the physical). Alterna- 
tive events require new (causal) explanations. Token-boundedness of rational 
explanations is a consequence of anti-reductionism based on Davidson’s ar- 
guments in “Mental Events” and subsequent essays.” 
From the conjunction of these claims it follows that events which have dif- 
ferent causal histories (and therefore have different identities) be submitted to 
different interpretations, even if the change in identity is due to a difference in 
the causal history that is not relevant within the interpretative, rational scheme 
we adopt in order to explain the original event under its mental description. 
This is paradoxical, because we readily assume that semantic distinctions or 
explanations of content ought to be based solely on semantically relevant 
facts, facts that figure in the scheme of rational explanation we adopt when 
making sense of persons. It is an almost generally accepted view in the philos- 
ophy of mind and action that non-mental facts (i.e. physical facts) cannot af- 
fect the correctness of mental descriptions. Semantic distinctions must be 
lo See Davidson (1987) for this conception of such a theory. 
‘I See Davidson (1980) for the details. 
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based on evidence visible only from within the intentional stance.12 What is 
not relevant from that point of view cannot affect semantic descriptions. 
The relevance of non-semantic elements is shown for intentional actions 
and for mental states. First, the problem of deviant causal chains. Think of 
Dan Dennett’s assassin who missed his victim but whose loud shot caused a 
stampede of bisons killing his adversary. The explanation of the killing of the 
victim in normal circumstances would never have mentioned all the elements 
that could have gone wrong in the causal chain starting with the bodily move- 
ment (pulling the trigger) and ending with the death of the victim. The expla- 
nation works because it points to what is relevant from the point of view of a 
rational explanation of that action. However, what was not relevant in the 
causal explanation of the successful action will, if absent or responsible for an 
alternative causal chain, become relevant and prevent us from applying the 
original description in the deviant case. 
The positive counterpart of this thesis is that no rational agent will be able 
to fix all the circumstances relevant to the success of his action. To illustrate 
this hypothesis, John Perry offers the following example: 
“Consider the force of gravity, if I am in space or on the moon. . . the movement [I nor- 
mally] envisage . . . will not lead to getting a drink. The water would fly out of the glass 
all over my face - or perhaps I would not even grab the glass but instead propel myself 
backwards. If all possible failures are to be accounted for by false beliefs, the corre- 
sponding true beliefs must be present when we succeed. So, when I reach for the glass, I 
must believe that the forces of gravity are just what they need to be, for things to work 
out right. But it hardly seems probable that everyone, even those with no knowledge of 
gravity, believes, when they reach for a glass of water, that the gravitational forces are 
what they are; such an attribution would drain the word “belief” of most of its content 
(. . .). A more efficient way of Mother Nature to proceed is to fit our psychology to the 
constant factors in our environment and give us a capacity of belief for dealing with the 
rest.” (Perry: 1986,131) 
“Dealing with the rest” is, in this context, the capacity for dealing with mental 
states caused in deviant ways or mental states in non-benevolent circumstan- 
ces. Twin Earth experiments offer an interesting (and well-known) class of 
non-benevolent contexts. Suppose I am, unbeknown to myself, transported 
to Twin Earth. In front of a glass of twater (a liquid closely resembling water, 
but with a different chemical structure - XYZ) ,  I may believe there is a glass of 
water in front of me, but I cannot say I know there is water in front of me. The 
l2 The same is true for moral facts: we do not assume that non-moral consideration can 
af fec t  the moral. But see Bums & Vergauwen (1991) for an alternative view on this issue. 
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non-semantically relevant causal history of my cognitive state affects its epi- 
stemic status. By the same token, we are not able to fix all the circumstances 
relevant to our having knowledge about the external world. From this, it 
doesn’t follow that we cannot have knowledge of our normal surroundings. A 
combined example is this: suppose, being on Twin Earth, I cannot say I inten- 
tionally drink a glass of water, because there’s no water in the glass I drink. Al- 
though I do not have to know all the properties of water to perform the inten- 
tional action of drinking a glass of water, replacing it by a glass of X Y Z  sus- 
pends the description “intentionally drinking a glass of water”. I have merely 
attempted to drink a glass of water. (Nothing says that this description must 
be available to me when I perform this act.) 
What lessons should be drawn from these cases? There are obvious 
counter-moves designed to avoid the seemingly disastrous conclusion that 
elements that are non-semantically relevant may suspend semantic descrip- 
tions. A well-known move consists of introducing a distinction between broad 
content and narrow content. The move is simple but radical: deny that the ele- 
ments that affect the truth of the mental description are not semantically rele- 
vant. Simply claim that they too are part of the semantic realm: they deter- 
mine the broad content of a belief, or the broad description of an intentional 
action. Broad content thus takes into account features that determine the 
truth-value of a belief (so the story goes). Although these allegedly semanti- 
cally relevant features must not be known to the speaker (to be explained by 
their location: they are located outside the head), they are part of the broad 
content of the belief. (The equivalent in action theory is Feinberg’s accordion 
theory: what I do is not only externally determined - the external elements are 
part of what I do.) The move is based on the following argument: 
(a) The identity of an event is partly based on its causal history. 
(b) Mental events with different causal histories have different identities and 
therefore require different causal explanations of their mental content. 
(c) Because nothing outside the semantic realm can affect semantic descrip- 
tions, we must assume that elements affecting the truth of the description are 
indeed semantically relevant. 
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Therefore, 
(d) systematic changes in the identity of a mental event by manipulating its 
causal history correlate with systematic changes in the content of that event. 
And from (d) it follows straightfonvardly that 
(e) thought experiments with possible worlds reveal the distinction between 
the subject’s contribution to his mental states and the world’s contribution to 
their content. 
But (d) does not follow, because (c) is simply false. The only sensible conclu- 
sion to be drawn from (b) is that alternative causal histories require alternative 
explanations. We make sense of an unsuccessful action not by inspecting what 
is common to a trying and a successful action, but by observing the alternative 
causal chain. Qualifymg a bodily movement as an unsuccessful action is based 
on an inspection of the causal history of the unsuccessful action. By the same 
token, qualification of a mental state as a false belief is based on inspection of 
its particular history. 
Thesis (c) leads to the erroneous idea that we could, with the help of 
thought experiments that change the causal history of an event (in most cases: 
the external history of the event), make a distinction between the contribution 
of the agent and the contribution of the world to the contents of his mental 
states. But (c) is not true. Alternative causal histories show that we disqualify 
a mental state as a state of knowledge or as an intentional action. We do not 
conclude from these cases that there is something common to the unsuccessful 
and the successful action, or arrive at what must be added to an internal rep- 
resentation to obtain its truth-condition. (Deviancy can occur between the 
reasons and the action.13) From alternative causal chains, nothing is learned as 
to what an agent cannot fail to do, or what an agent cannot fail to know. Stipu- 
lating alternative causal chains does not tell us (and cannot tell us) the limits of 
the autonomy of the agent or which elements of content he has privileged 
access to. 
Changing the causal history of a cognitive state comes down to creating a 
new token which requires an alternative interpretation. No common (inter- 
nal) element is identified, and neither can we detect the systematic contribu- 
tion of the world to the content of the token unless it is explicitly given when 
stipulating the alternative causal history, but that move trivializes the experi- 
ment. There is no specific or systematic item we can eliminate from the causal 
history of a state of knowledge to arrive at a mere belief. The alternative state 
l3 See Davidson, uAgency’’, in Davidson (1980). 
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(a mere belief state, or an unsuccessful action) is individuated by inspecting 
the alternative causal chain. The relation between the history of a person we 
use to make sense of him and a particular deviant chain is that of a normal 
background on which deviant cases (actions that turn out to be mere tryings, 
cognitive states which are mere beliefs) are projected. That normal back- 
ground includes elements which are not relevant when specifymg the content 
of mental states, but which nevertheless determine their identity. 
As alternative causal chains suspend mental descriptions, we are tempted 
to think that by stipulating external alternatives, we detect the contribution of 
the world to the content of our beliefs. And the world outside must contribute 
to the content of mental states on the basis of the principle that nothing can af- 
fect the correctness of descriptions of content unless it enters into the content 
of mental states. But that principle is simply not true: non-semantic facts, or 
non-contentful events do affect the correctness of semantic descriptions. 
When confronted with a glass of water, we normally do not mention that it is 
H,O the speaker knows is in front of him; but when water is replaced by its 
well-known Twin Earth variant or, more mundane, by a deceivingly similar 
liquid, we do not say that the agent knows there’s water in his glass. He merely 
believes there’s water in his glass. The Twin Earth variant forces us to describe 
the agent as merely believing there’s water in front of him, but it does not fol- 
low that the (“broad”) content of his mental state must mention that there’s 
XYZ out there. It simply affects the epistemic status of his cognitive state. 
Nothing in this story amounts to a difference in content between a state of 
knowledge and the content of a corresponding (“mere”) belief state. 
The same is true for actions. When a deviant causal chain occurs, the 
deviant element allows us to describe what the agent did as an attempt to A, 
not as intentionally A-ing. The alternative chain doesn’t affect the description 
of the attempt. We describe the attempt using a sentence that would be true 
were the action successful. That description is available insofar as we are able 
to project the unsuccessful action or the mere belief on a background of suc- 
cessful actions and states of knowledge. That background is offered by the 
history of the person. The difference between the world in which an agent suc- 
cessfully acts and a world in which he fails doesn’t tell us what was common to 
both cases and what is (therefore) supposed to play a central role in a theory 
that accounts for both successful and unsuccessful actions. Too many things 
can go wrong; nothing remains a priori constant among the possible variants 
we can imagine. 
I conclude that differences in external circumstances are relevant for the 
ascription of content, not because they reveal a systematic semantic contribu- 
tion of those circumstances to the content of a mental state (its “broad con- 
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tent”), but because any break with the normal background reveals the de- 
pendence of the validity of semantic descriptions on prima facienon-semanti- 
ally relevant features making up the normal circumstances in which we ac- 
quire knowledge or act successfully. 
What, then, is the relation between the intentional action and a mere at- 
tempt, or between a state of knowledge and a mere belief? Representationa- 
lists see the relation as follows: to arrive at the contents of a belief, we must 
substract the contribution of the world, the external circumstances, from the 
corresponding knowledge token (that would be a consequence of Devitt’s ex- 
traction-problem - cf. supra). The contribution of the world to the meaning 
of “water” is that it is HzO, and therefore one cannot be in a state of knowl- 
edge about water unless one knows it is H 2 0  or adds to the belief that it is a be- 
lief about H20.  Similarly, what must be substracted from intentionally drink- 
ing water to arrive at an attempt is the contribution the world makes to that ac- 
tion. The description of the attempt cannot refer to water but must be some- 
thing like an attempt to drink a tasteless, colorless liquid (if that is what the ex- 
traction would amount to). 
I contend that it is more apt to talk of an addition problem than to talk of a 
subtraction problem. What must be added to a knowledge state to obtain a 
(mere) belief state are deviant circumstances that prevent one from being in a 
state of knowledge. What must be added to an intentional action (drinking 
water) to obtain a mere attempt to drink water are the deviant circumstances 
that prevent one from being successful. More important, however, is the fact 
that we are not able to demarcate a fragment in the causal chain that is com- 
mon to both cases. 
5. Externalism and the subjective character of the mental 
Thought experiments which vary external circumstances play a double 
role. There is, first of all, their demarcation-function: they are supposed to 
make a distinction between truth-conditions and verification-conditions, what 
remains “constant” from the point of view of the agent and what makes such 
states true. Blackburn (1984) aptly dubs this the “spinning the possible 
worlds-strategy”. But if my thesis is correct, we can no longer discriminate, by 
spinning the possible worlds, the contribution of the agent from the contribu- 
tion of the world. Blackburn associates this strategy with the subjective charac- 
ter of mental states as follows: the purpose of spinning the possible worlds is: 
“(to) keep things as much as possible the same from the subject’s point of view, while im- 
agining different external causes of his being in the state he is in.” (Blackburn: 1984,312) 
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If my version of externalism is correct, Blackburn’s strategy is doomed to fail. 
Variations in the external (or internal) causal history of a mental token affect 
its identity and therefore suspend the correctness of the mental description it 
verifies. As we have seen, it doesn’t follow from this claim that the variation 
introduced in the thought experiment enters into the description of the con- 
tent of the original or new mental token. Events with different causal histories, 
however similar they may be, require different causal explanations. 
The circumstances we live in - those that make it possible for us to act in- 
tentionally or to be in the position of someone who knows what’s going on in 
the world - matter a lot to us. It would be futile to say that external states, 
events and circumstances that figure in one’s personal history and thus make 
up what one believes and says, do not matter, even from a so-called “subjec- 
tive” point of view. They determine who we are and what we do. Who would 
deny that such features are not relevant from a subjective point of view? It is 
hard to reject the idea that whether or not one successfully kills someone (and 
thus becomes a murderer) is not important for him or her. The same is true for 
the distinction between knowledge and belief when I come to believe some- 
thing in a deviant way, or because I was transported to a different world, or, 
more down to earth, because the world has drastically changed, I can no 
longer claim that I carry information about the world. Being in the position of 
someone who knows his way around in the world is an all-important matter 
for the picture we have of ourselves. A full conception of myself must be 
based on more than what I do with my body or what arrives at my retina. 
“But this is not an account of what I have private access to”, some may ob- 
ject to these remarks. Indeed it is not. If the causal history is relevant to deter- 
mine the content of what I do, know, try or believe, it no longer makes sense to 
say there is an inner realm that accounts for the asymmetry between self- 
knowledge and knowledge about other persons. How can we then explain the 
asymmetry? 
Davidson has described the asymmetry as an authority problem. We ac- 
cept self-descriptions by other persons as true because they play a central role 
in building a theory for their language and their mind. Accepting them as true 
plays a constitutive role when interpreting (making sense) of other persons. 
The authority I have is due to others deferring to me about my self-ascribed 
thoughts. But how convincing is this? “Suppose no one deferred to me about 
my self-ascribed thoughts. Would my confidence that I know what these 
thoughts are diminish? Do I not know my thoughts whether or not others ac- 
knowledge that I do?” (LePore: 1989, 210). 
The position I have outlined in this paper contains an -hportant element 
that may help explain at least one aspect of the asymmetry. Part of the argu- 
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ment against the “spinning the possible worlds-strategy” was that there is no 
point in changing the external circumstances so as to detect what remains 
“constant” from the subject’s point of view. This seems to imply that the al- 
leged asymmetry between the first person and the third person is a mere illu- 
sion; content is determined by what is outside the head. What I contend now is 
that the basis for the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of 
the mental life of other persons is actually rooted in the fact that it is the par- 
ticular causal history of a person that reveals what he thinks and what his words 
mean. There is and will always be an other minds-problem, in this sense: how- 
ever well I understand a person (having understood him on the basis of his his- 
tory), I could never apply that explanation to a different, third person, and 
claim to understand that person on the basis of what I already know about the 
second person (or, by the same token, what I already know about myself). If 
interpretation is token-bounded, understanding is based on interpretation, not 
on the application of a ready-made theory to particular cases. 
If this is true, we have an obvious reason why there is a genuine asymmetry 
between you and me. Every person has the privilege that he is the only one 
who, by interacting with the world as best as he can, makes evidence available 
to his interpreter. “Making evidence available” doesn’t mean that he has pri- 
vate access to an inner realm and then, in a second move, goes public through 
interaction with the world; it means that he is the only one who can, by inter- 
acting with his environment, enable us to arrive at a causal explanation of 
what he believes. He creates his own, personal history - the history that makes 
it possible to determine what is, for him, a normal context, what are, for him, 
normal circumstances and how they shed light on deviating cases. This is what 
determines his authority. 
What we know about our own mind is not available as a kind of theory we 
can apply to other persons (and neither can we apply the theory that was 
geared to a given person to someone else), because that would violate the 
token-boundedness of rational interpretations. We must, of course, use our 
own beliefs, desires and language when understanding other persons, but that 
is a substantially weaker (but definitely more correct) thesis than the more 
controversial one that we can apply a theory that makes sense of ourselves to 
other persons. 
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